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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________________
Nos. 16-3128 & 16-3656
________________
HASSAN M. ELANANY
a/k/a Hassan Magdy Eltabey Mohamed Ela,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A058-555-250)
Immigration Judge: Roxanne C. Hladylowycz

________________
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on May 24, 2017
Before: HARDIMAN, ROTH and FISHER, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: February 27, 2018)
________________
OPINION *
________________

ROTH, Circuit Judge
*

This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

Hassan M. Elanany is a native and citizen of Egypt. He is in removal proceedings
and seeks cancellation of removal. He petitioned for review of the agency determination
that he does not merit discretionary cancellation of removal. We will deny the petition.
I. Background
On September 19, 2006, at age 14, Elanany was admitted to the United States
from Egypt as a lawful permanent resident. On April 23, 2012, he was convicted of retail
theft. On January 22, 2015, he was convicted of terroristic threats, stalking, and
possession of a controlled substance. The Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
began removal proceedings. Elanany conceded removability but sought cancellation of
removal; he submitted evidence of completion of a drug treatment program. On
September 29, 2015, the Immigration Judge (IJ) concluded that Elanany was eligible for
cancellation of removal but denied relief as a matter of discretion due to Elanany’s
criminal history. Elanany appealed the IJ’s decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA), submitted further evidence of drug treatment, and filed a motion to remand to the
IJ. On June 14, 2016, the BIA dismissed the appeal and denied the motion. Elanany
filed a motion to reconsider, partly based on the BIA’s failure to consider his evidence of
completing a drug treatment program and partly based on new evidence submitted with
his motion: a scholarly article relating to remorse. On August 18, 2016, the BIA issued a
new decision that evaluated his motion both as a motion to reconsider and a motion to
reopen. Granting the motion to reconsider, the BIA took into account the evidence of
rehabilitation. However, it denied the motion to reopen and remand, again affirming the
2

IJ’s denial of relief as a matter of discretion. It concluded that Elanany’s extensive
criminal history, insufficient showing of remorse, and inadequate rehabilitation
outweighed his limited positive equities. Elanany now petitions for review of the denial
of the motion to reopen.
II. Discussion
A. Jurisdiction and Decision Under Review
Under 8 U.S.C. § 1252, when we review immigration proceedings, we have
jurisdiction to decide constitutional claims and questions of law but not challenges to
discretionary determinations. 1 “Because the BIA issued its own decision, we review that
decision, and not that of the IJ.”2 However, “we will review the IJ’s . . . opinion to the
extent that the BIA relied upon [it].” 3 After a motion to reconsider/reopen, we primarily
focus our review on the second BIA decision; when the BIA’s second decision employed
the same reasoning as the first, we have no need to refer to the first, and when the second
employed different reasoning, the first is without effect. 4
B. Failing to Consider Evidence and Provide Analysis
Elanany first argues that the BIA failed to consider and analyze all material
evidence. This is a question of due process: An alien facing removal is entitled to due
process, including an individualized determination considering “the evidence and

1

Sukwanputra v. Gonzales, 434 F.3d 627, 634 (3d Cir. 2006).
Sheriff v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 587 F.3d 584, 588 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Ezeagwuna v.
Ashcroft, 301 F.3d 116, 126 (3d Cir. 2002)).
3
Wang v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 423 F.3d 260, 267 (3d Cir. 2005).
4
See Thomas v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 625 F.3d 134, 140 (3d Cir. 2010).
2
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argument that [the alien] presents.” 5 Elanany faults the BIA’s decision because he claims
that it mentions only one item of evidence that it considered—the scholarly article related
to remorse—and summarily treats the other evidence by referring to it as “the remaining
evidence.” However, he mischaracterizes the BIA’s decision, which also refers to “a
February 2016 drug treatment completion certificate” and states that Elanany’s
“rehabilitative efforts . . . are laudable[.]” 6 Moreover, the evidence of rehabilitation that
Elanany faults the BIA for failing to mention showed that Elanany had completed some
drug treatment and was continuing further drug treatment. Thus, we have no basis to
conclude that the BIA did not consider the evidence that Elanany presented.
C. Applying the Wrong Legal Standards
Elanany next argues that the BIA applied the wrong legal standards in its decision
denying the motion to reopen. 7 The BIA may deny a motion to reopen or remand for
several reasons, two of which are that the movant has not made out a prima facie case
and that the movant does not merit discretionary relief. 8 Here, Elanany refers to the
sentence in the BIA’s decision stating, “The remaining evidence does not change our

5

Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 549 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting Llana-Castellon v.
I.N.S., 16 F.3d 1093, 1096 (10th Cir. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted). We
review the denial of a motion to reopen for abuse of discretion, but “we review de novo
the Board’s determination of an underlying procedural due process claim.” Fadiga v.
Attorney Gen. U.S., 488 F.3d 142, 153 (3d Cir. 2007).
6
App. 6.
7
We review “whether the BIA applied the correct legal standard in considering the
motion to reopen” de novo. Fadiga, 488 F.3d at 153-54.
8
I.N.S. v. Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1988); Huang v. Attorney Gen. of U.S., 620 F.3d
372, 389 (3d Cir. 2010); Matter of Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. 464, 472 (BIA 1992).
4

conclusion that the respondent does not merit discretionary relief[,]” 9 and observes that
the BIA then cites cases that, among other things, describe the elements of a prima facie
case. He argues that this juxtaposition indicates that the BIA may have confused the
factors for discretionary relief with the elements of a prima facie case.
We do not agree. The cases cited following the quoted sentence explain that the
BIA may skip discussion of the prima facie case if it decides that, in its discretion, it
would deny relief in any event. 10 Here, the BIA did precisely that and the citation
supports the proposition that it had the authority to do so. We see no confusion about
standards in the BIA’s decision.
Elanany further argues that the BIA’s decision considered only rehabilitation, even
though there are many factors to consider in deciding whether to grant cancellation of
removal. 11 Elanany concedes, however, that the BIA considered his positive equities as
well. Moreover, the BIA expressly relied on the IJ’s decision, which balanced the
equities at length. The BIA addressed only those factors that it was revisiting from the
IJ’s decision, and there was no need for it to do more. Hence, we find no error. 12
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition.

9

App. 6.
This is true both for a motion to reopen and a motion to remand. Abudu, 485 U.S. at
105; Huang, 620 F.3d at 389; Coelho, 20 I. & N. Dec. at 472-73.
11
See In re C-V-T-, 22 I. & N. Dec. 7, 11 (BIA 1998) (listing factors).
12
Elanany raises a third claim, that the BIA should have granted his motion to reopen
because it was supported by substantial evidence, but this is a challenge to the BIA’s
exercise of discretion and, as discussed above, we lack jurisdiction to address it.
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